Thanks for digging into this @rnbrady! Since you answered your own questions, I’ll just add some comments: An anonymity set of 2 is pretty dismal, and that’s in the best case (assuming the user didn’t send it straight to one of the attacker’s nodes) – for low-resource attackers – before other attacks/analysis. E.g. if the transaction spends a CashFusion output, and you’re broadcasting using the same node or Fulcrum server you were using before the CashFusion – you’ve probably helped attackers...
Where did you get the figure of 2 for the anonymity set of Monero (that has other privacy features that you forgot to mention)? Maybe you are oversimplifying a complex problem.
I did not present a figure of 2 specifically. The point is Monero is more vulnerable than previously believed but still this is likely irrelevant to casual users as no one will put so much effort into mass tracing anyway. Given this logic, for the vast majority of users Bitcoin Cash with CashFusion is private enough IMO.
Using standard statistical methods, that ring size of 16 shrinks to an average of 4.2, slashing Monero’s privacy by about 75% compared to what was previously assumed.
Where did you get the figure of 2 for the anonymity set of Monero (that has other privacy features that you forgot to mention)? Maybe you are oversimplifying a complex problem.
I did not present a figure of 2 specifically. The point is Monero is more vulnerable than previously believed but still this is likely irrelevant to casual users as no one will put so much effort into mass tracing anyway. Given this logic, for the vast majority of users Bitcoin Cash with CashFusion is private enough IMO.
https://news.bitcoinprotocol.org/monero-privacy-faces-new-threat-with-map-decoder-attack-heres-what-you-need-to-know/