- cross-posted to:
- pulse_of_truth@infosec.pub
- cross-posted to:
- pulse_of_truth@infosec.pub
cross-posted from: https://infosec.pub/post/42164102
Researchers demo weaknesses affecting some of the most popular options Academics say they found a series of flaws affecting three popular password managers, all of which claim to protect user credentials in the event that their servers are compromised.…



Keepass, upload the database file to random free cloud accounts after making changes to the database.
This is foulproof as long as the end-user device doesn’t get hacked, right?
Edit: Did I say something wrong? Why downvotes? Database file are encrypted, even if someone gets it, its encrypted and they don’t have your password.
So its basically safe to upload your database. If you think I’m wrong then explain why I can’t use free cloud accounts to store an encrypted file?
This is terrible advice, even if I assume you are also using a key-file on a removable usb. An attacker can brute force decrypt your db. There is no rate limiting when you literally have the database file, they could replicate it across thousands of servers each with dozens of cores, each core trying a dozen keyphrases per second. That’s assuming a motivated attacker like a government or crypto scammers, but why open yourself to that possibility?
Why would you do that? Just sync thr database with Syncthing and keep it locally on your devices. I’d never put my pw dB in a publicly available cloud online, even though it’s encrypted.
For backup.
So all of my hard drives and devices are in the same house, if I was sleeping and and house caught on fire and I couldn’t even get my phone in time (just a worst case example), then I lose all my passwords.
Cloud is my “offsite backup”. Cuz where else would I put stuff?
Also: I though you could just safely upload encrypted files to Google Drive, why not a password database? It’s just another encrypted file.
I see. For this scenario, I have another Syncthing server, which is on 24/7, responsible for offsite backups.
Ad encrypted files: true, but why expose them to a potential adversary? If there should be a flaw in the encryption (now or future) the other party already has access to the file.